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The information space of the Baltic re-
gion has gradually developed since the 
free exchange of cross-border messages 
was made possible by media technology 
and international law. The international 
conflict between Russia and some coun-
tries of the European Union has become a 
factor hampering its sustainable develop-
ment. Moreover, the conflict has adversely 
affected the functioning of many civil soci-
ety institutions in the Baltic Sea region. 
This study focuses on the publications in 
the scientific media associated with the po-
litical technologies that may provoke con-
flict but must contribute to good-neigh-
bourly relations in the region. We carry 
out a comprehensive political analysis and 
a specific examination of the Western sci-
entific media to develop a package of mea-
sures that Russia can take to counter the 
conflict-provoking influences in the region. 
The current condition of the regional in-
formation space and information opera-
tions aimed at inciting Russophobia and 
forcing Russia out of the European politi-
cal process is indicative of the politicisa-
tion of social sciences and the humanities 
and of the mythologisation of the policies 
of the regional social structures. The con-
flict must be urgently resolved, since the 
political technologies, which cause insta-
bility in the information space, damage the 
reputations of all the states involved. To 
reconcile the differences that underlie the 
information conflict in the Baltic region it 
is necessary to take into account common 
interests. There is a pressing need to join 
efforts in solving the challenging social 
problems that cannot be overcome without 
either international cooperation among the 
countries or effective social partnership. 
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The social conflict in the information space of the Baltic region has 
become one of the most serious problems for Russia's foreign policy. Ac-
cording to research, the information space of the Baltic region is an inte-
gral, although quite special, part of the global media communications [1; 
2]. This space consists of the states with different political systems, histo-
ry, culture and economy. At the same time, all the countries of the Baltic 
Sea basin share liberal ideology and Christian values that is common for 
Europe [3]. The duty of states to cooperate includes the information ex-
change aimed to improve the well-being of the European peoples in gen-
eral and the Baltic region in particular. The need for cooperation has re-
ceived international recognition at the level of the Organization for Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and all national administrations 
must ensure it in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations (UN). Due to the consistent efforts of European 
states, the initiative to create the Baltic Sea Common Information Space 
(BCIS) was developed by 2005 within the framework of the Council of 
the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) [4; 5]. However, it has never been fully im-
plemented for political reasons. 
In 2001—2005, during the meetings of Senior Officials on Infor-
mation Society (SOIS) of the Council of the Baltic Sea States the concept 
of the Common Information Space of the Baltic Sea Region was present-
ed. It aimed at providing access to various regional sources of infor-
mation on the economy, trade and investment, as well as on business de-
velopment [4]. This political initiative also did not receive a wide practi-
cal development. The common information space of the Baltic Sea region 
developed naturally. It became an arena for conflicting global media pro-
cesses, Russian political science as well as the politics of some European 
states described as informational, or hybrid war [6—12]. The Doctrine of 
Information Security of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree of 
the President of the Russian Federation of December 5, 2016 No. 646, 
defines the list of national interests in the information sphere. Its aim is 
the development of the international information security system (para-
graph 8 d.), though such a system is extremely difficult to organize in the 
context of information war. 
Professor at the University of Tartu (Tartu Ülikool) Vyacheslav Mo-
rozov reasonably notices that the relations between Russia and the Baltic 
countries, being a weak link in the Baltic region, can improve due to the 
reasonable context of national identity in current political discourse [13, 
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p. 317]. In 2004, it was obvious that the Baltic States were no longer seen 
in Europe as the embodiment of a “false”, anti-Russian Europe [13]. Ho-
wever, after the events of 2014, the political situation has changed. The 
media space of the Baltic region was fragmented by national principle 
[2], the regional policy of Russia began to rely heavily on “soft power” 
[14], and some Western studies directly claim that the situation in the re-
gion is now moving to a “new cold war” [15]. Russia's European partners 
fear a revision of state borders [16] and believe there is a risk to the exist-
ence of rhizomatic (culturally diverse) information networks in the Baltic 
Sea region, the political space of the Interreg Baltic Sea Region Program 
2014—2020 [17]. 
The study hypothesis is that the interests of political structures com-
peting for authority in the foreign policy studies shaped the policy of 
NATO countries on the information space of the Baltic region. The Ame-
rican scientist Jonathan Mercer rightly notes that the opinion of the world 
community, some scientific structures and prestige are crucial for world 
politics, since states having prestige have more power, though the politi-
cal goals that determine the authority of a particular country must be con-
sistent with its capabilities [18, p. 133]. The article uses the discourse 
analysis to interpret doctrinal political texts reflecting a complex of poli-
tical technologies that in the social and political conditions of the Baltic 
region provoke a conflict in the information space. 
It was obvious to the scientific community in 2013 that the possibili-
ties and prospects for cooperation between the Russian Federation and 
the EU should be the subject of constant attention and discussion of the 
Russian and European expert-academic communities [19]. However, as 
can be seen from the leading regional media, after 2014 the already 
thorny path to partnership [19, p. 466—468] in the media policy of the 
Baltic region degraded into an explicit political conflict. The political 
technologies for creating an international conflict are reflected not only in 
numerous news media materials [4] but also in Western scientific litera-
ture [11; 12; 20—27]. This seems a natural target for critical analyses 
pursuing the task of demonstrating the limitations of a narrow national 
approach to information security problems in the implementation of some 
political programs in the Baltic Sea region. 
At the same time, without a doubt, the “strengthening of interstate 
and interregional cooperation in the Baltic region” is of considerable sci-
entific interest to progressive institutions of civil society [3, p. 12]. Ob-
jectively there is also another political tendency aimed at creating the at-
mosphere of conflict and mistrust. This article analyzes the political tech-
nologies exploited by Western scientific media for creating an “enemy 
image” [28] in the Baltic Sea region. Sharing the opinion of Professor 
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Konstantin Khudoley that "Russia must do everything possible to prevent 
the outbreak of [armed] conflict in the Baltic Sea region" [29, p. 18], it is 
necessary, however, to notice that the international conflict in the Pan-
European media space has a negative effect on the anti-Russian sentiment 
in the Baltic States. In our opinion, the relations between all parties in-
volved in the conflict should be normalized through the natural prefer-
ence for transforming regional political “institutions by saturating them 
with new practices” [30, p. 88]. The method of political modeling applied 
in the process of creating and introducing new cooperation practices aims 
at forming good-neighbourly relations in the Baltic region by identifying 
conflict-takers and eliminating their influence on regional policy. 
 
Russia and the EU states as participants 
in an international conflict in the information space  
of the Baltic region 
 
In his interview on September 1, 2016, with John Micklethwait, jour-
nalist of the international information agency “Bloomberg”, President of 
the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, emphasized that “Russia has been 
pursuing absolutely peaceful foreign policy aimed at cooperation, and 
will continue to do so... As for the influence, … we want it to be absolu-
tely peaceful and positive. What we have in mind is economic and huma-
nitarian influence, which implies developing equal cooperation with our 
neighbours. This is what our foreign policy, as well as our foreign eco-
nomic policy, is aimed at” [31]. It is obvious why the head of the Russian 
state address that symbolic invitation for cooperation to the global com-
munity to representatives of world business and voiced at the Far Eastern 
Federal University. He used the authority of the Bloomberg media hol-
ding to convince representatives of the business community that good 
neighbourliness in coastal spaces is mutually beneficial and military con-
flict resolution measures are not in line with the national interests of the 
Russian Federation, as they would inflict economic damage to the entire 
global community. 
The resolution strategy for the contradictions in the Baltic region is 
definitely based on the striving for justice — the personal quality, which 
Vladimir Putin outlined in the above-mentioned interview as the domi-
nant feature of the Russian mentality. The urgent need for a fair approach 
to resolving the conflict in the information space of both the Far East and 
the Baltic region is manifested in the strategic futility of confrontation 
between nations with a common history, culture and civilizational values 
facing the challenges of violent extremism, terrorism, uncontrolled mi-
gration and the digital divide in a postindustrial, transitive society [8]. 
 Information technology 
24 
The characteristics of media institutions [32] and media policy, which 
reflects the content of leading media, is determined by the ideological 
and diplomatic aspects of the national security of states. After the reunifi-
cation of Russia and the Crimea, “the problems of self-identification and 
positioning in the new turbulent world came to the fore in the national 
consciousness of the Russians” [33, p. 183]. At the same time, in the con-
text of global information confrontation, the media policy of many West-
ern states is aimed at acquiring the right of foisting certain views on the 
world community [8, p. 73]. 
In the information space of the European Union, it is customary to 
talk about security in the context of a threat to democratic ideals coming 
from the east, from Russia. However, in the Russian Federation there is a 
growing understanding that a strong Russian state causes xenophobia in 
certain representatives of political forces of the European Union states. 
The aspirations of the peoples living on the shores of the Baltic Sea to 
productive political efforts to achieve a safe world and a fundamentally 
new, better quality of life for the people of the region are quite natural. 
Nevertheless, the political establishment of a united Europe shows re-
strained optimism to such an approach and frank resistance to Russian 
influence [26], which some states and a number of representatives of Eu-
ropean civil society suggest to neutralize by implementation of the worst 
isolationist traditions of the Soviet era [22]. 
Since 1991 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been developing the 
Baltic Assembly and the Baltic Council without the participation of Rus-
sia. Working outside the Council of the Baltic Sea States established in 
1992 by the Copenhagen Declaration these small states seek to counter 
the influence of the Russian state by their “pro-European” policies. The 
lack of desire of the Baltic Council states to participate in mutually bene-
ficial cooperation in solving the fundamental political problems of the 
Baltic region generates more and more conflict-prone messages and doc-
uments from all European Union countries. The marginal unwillingness 
to recognize the Russian language and Russian culture as one of the most 
important elements in the regional and global information space produces 
the same outcome. For example, the Joint Statement on the results of the 
22nd session of the Baltic Council of October 28, 2016, says, “the Baltic 
States... regret that there have been no considerable developments with 
regard to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania will continue to support all measures taken by the OSCE, 
the EU and NATO demanding Russia to play an active role in imple-
menting its international commitments.” [34] The position of the Baltic 
Council states in many respects impedes international integration and 
provokes an escalation of the conflict, which is disadvantageous to most 
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countries of the Baltic region. According to the authoritative opinion of 
the Russian sociologist Renald Simonyan, in this conflict “the uncritical 
perception of new myths both by one and the other side is largely due to 
the existence of two isolated information spaces” [1, p. 105]. With a high 
degree of probability “false stereotypes of the mass consciousness be-
come a breeding ground for the escalation of interethnic confrontation” 
[1, p. 105]. 
It should be noted that the socio-economic and ideological problems 
of Europe [35] directly affect the media industry in the region. The Joint 
Statement following the 22nd session of the Baltic Council says, “Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania confirm their readiness to promote initiatives 
that encourage the media to offer the public high-quality, responsible, 
reliable and independent journalism... In particular, the Baltic States will 
continue to work together to explore the best ways how to reach out to 
those parts of society which are not easy to access due to the language 
barrier and different consumption of media content” [34]. Such state-
ments declare a certain level of competence of those journalists who fail 
to reach understanding with their target audience reading international 
materials on the Baltic issues in English and Russian. 
 
Modern political technologies of conflict management analysis  
in the information space of the Baltic region 
 
The ambiguity of the situation in the information space of the Baltic 
region is becoming increasingly apparent for European scientists and in-
stitutions interested in constructive cooperation with the Russians. Pro-
fessor of the University of Helsinki Kristi Raik notes, “Contrary to some 
expectations, the Baltic states’ accession to the EU in 2004 was not fol-
lowed by an improvement in their relations with Russia. Instead, the Bal-
tic States became known as the “troublemakers” of EU — Russia rela-
tions. This was commonly explained by their history and national identi-
ty, which contributed to an understanding of the Baltic concerns as mar-
ginal.” [25, p. 237]. 
The political myopia of some states that are fundamentally concerned 
about the presence of the Russian world in the Baltic States and oppose 
the idea of Russia's integration into the political space from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok accompanies the accusations against the Russian state in im-
perial ambitions [11; 23; 27; 36]. All the absurdity of anti-Soviet rhetoric 
in the news media in the post-Soviet space of the Baltic States received a 
decent scientific assessment in the works of Russian scientists Olga Ven-
dina, Vladimir Kolosov, Alexander Sebentsov [37]. In the socio-political 
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reality the conflict in the information space of the Baltic states leads to 
the fact that “the contradictions between the political discourse and socio-
economic realities, the discrepancy of information drawn from the TV 
and textbooks, with information disseminated through the Internet and 
obtained from personal experience, contributes not so much the strength-
ening of patriotism and national-state identity, as much as a skepticism 
about the events of the past and the present” [37, p. 90]. The controver-
sial influence of a number of Baltic scientific media, which deserves in-
dependent doctrinal evaluation, raises even more concerns due to the fact 
that this phenomenon cannot be attributed to populism and low qualifica-
tion of journalists. 
It was in the beginning of the 21st century that a significant part of 
the Russian and foreign scientific community connected the main prob-
lems of assessing the security of the Baltic region with the accession of 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to NATO [35]. The political elites of these 
states still regard participation in NATO as the main guarantee of nation-
al security [12]. We can observe political hostility to Russia in some 
studies of Polish scientists who offer a new interpretation of the term "an-
ti-diplomacy" [23], some Finnish political studies with rather extravagant 
titles assigning anti-Russian meaning to the term "democracy" [26], Wes-
tern attitude towards the fate of the Crimea [34]. This is dangerous mani-
festation of the inability of some Europeans to reckon with the conse-
quences of political transformations taking place in Russia. 
Russia is more interested than other countries in helping the world 
community to solve the problems in the quality of human life. Paradoxi-
cally, some foreign scientists wish to prove that Poland, Lithuania, Fin-
land and a number of other countries are not responsible for the political 
situation in the Baltic States or some problems in the implementation of 
the political program of development of the Baltic Sea region. They insist 
on the fact that Russia is the source of all political problems. This odious 
and subversive political position is very far from social science, and es-
pecially from diplomacy. Therefore, those who carry out such policy are 
interested in deepening existing contradictions, right down to the real re-
vival of the fascists, whose invention was the “paradiplomacy of intimi-
dation” [20]. 
The professor of the University of the Basque Country in Bilbao 
(Spain) Noe Cornago writes about the positive connotations of the term 
"anti-diplomacy" as a way to emphasize the merits of frank and direct 
communication in comparison with diplomatic formality in the context of 
political views of Giuseppe Garibaldi. Subsequently, any positive conno-
tation of the term “anti-diplomacy” disappears in the new semantics with-
in the framework of the ideology of futurism, and then fascism, and its 
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use is “charged with negative content” [38, p. 23]. Anti-diplomacy is the 
result of intra-European contradictions. The problem of diplomatic rela-
tions between Russia and the EU countries is not much different from 
interstate relations within the EU itself. Protecting their own national in-
terests, European governments quite often apply double standards with 
respect to the most complex foreign policy topics affecting the issues of 
population migration, the territorial integrity of states and some other po-
litically and economically significant issues. Objective differences in the 
organization of the national economy of Russia and the economies of the 
EU states (language barriers, environmental standards, approaches to se-
curity, features of public administration, principles of the judicial system, 
etc.) create conditions for discrimination, mistrust and deep political con-
flicts. 
The information space of the Baltic States creates a somewhat naive 
image of Russia supposedly burdened by the traditions of the Byzantine 
collectivism alien to the rest of Europe and the USA [39]. American sci-
entists are alleging that President of the Russian Federation Vladimir 
Putin achieves his goals by combining imperative and soft power with 
elements of Soviet-style propaganda [36]. The principal difference be-
tween the diplomacy of Vladimir Putin from the ideals of anti-diplomacy 
by Giuseppe Garibaldi lies in the non-recognition of the current state of 
political affairs in the United States and Great Britain as a benchmark of 
justice. Russia's aspiration to develop in the context of a national culture 
without any thoughtless imitation caused some accusations in imperial 
ambitions. A number of politicians and scholars who are quite authorita-
tive in the Baltic Council countries brought these accusations. Due to 
their stereotypes, they are convinced that Europe as a whole and the Bal-
tic Sea region in particular can reach the goals of sustainable develop-
ment without Russia [5; 11; 12; 21; 22; 24; 27; 40]. After the collapse of 
the USSR, Russia harmoniously fit into European politics, shares Euro-
pean values, participates in international communication and gradually 
expands its sphere of political influence, but with the strengthening of the 
Russian Federation its relations with European countries and NATO have 
been gradually deteriorating [35]. 
The conflict environment in the European media space is created by 
the complex of fictitious threats introduced into the mass consciousness, 
such as the revival of Russian Bolshevism, the imperial ambitions of the 
Russians and the danger of Russian military aggression against the states 
in the Baltic Sea region [26; 27; 31]. Countering the frightening myths 
about Russia is an extremely important condition for the normalization of 
relations in the information space of the region. An example of construc-
tive communication in the Baltic region was the work of the EU-Russia 
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Research Center (CEURUS) in the Johan Skytte Institute for Policy Stud-
ies, established at the University of Tartu. However, in our opinion, its 
work cannot be fully successful without being connected to the projects 
of leading Russian scientific institutions, scientists and students from 
Russia. 
Our attention to the research activity of the American Johns Hopkins 
University and the Institute of International Relations and Political Sci-
ence at Vilnius University is due to the conflict-causing content of a large 
part of political studies on Russian issues funded by these institutions. Si-
milar conflict-prone political structures operate in Poland, Sweden, Fin-
land, generating a significant number of anti-Russian texts, in an attempt 
to shift political responsibility for the quality of national policy from the 
national governments of the Baltic Region States to Russia. Problems in 
the relations of peoples in the Baltic seem to be of a private institutional 
nature, derived from the interest of specific institutions in fomenting his-
torical contradictions that are not do not pose a significant threat to the 
functioning of the common regional information space. 
After 2014, research activity by Johns Hopkins University, which tra-
ditionally pays special attention to US foreign policy interests, switched 
from externally neutral forms of intervention in the information space of 
the Baltic region (through analytical materials such as the collection of 
articles “Regional Development in the Baltic Sea Region” [42]) to the 
direct opposition of Russia and NATO. For example, the Swedish scien-
tist Gudrun Persson, a specialist in the military history of Russia, in his 
article “Russia and the Baltic Sea Security” positions Russia's policy as a 
threat to regional security. He expresses serious concern about the fact 
that “Not only has Russia increased its aggressive behavior with nuclear 
weapons in and around the Baltic Sea, the official nuclear rhetoric is also 
unprecedented in Russian and Soviet history” [24, p. 14]. The American 
institute uses such clearly absurd, “scientific” prospects of atomic weap-
on deployment in the Baltic region to form anti-Russian sentiments in the 
Baltic and legitimize the presence of the American military in the region. 
The studies of leading experts on Russia at the Institute of Internatio-
nal Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University [12; 40; 43; 45] 
demonstrate the mythologization of the enemy’s image of Russia and 
promote a provocative approach to the political problems of modern his-
tory. This continues the traditions established by Zbigniew Brzezinski, an 
honorary professor at Vilnius University. Tomas Janeliūnas, one of the 
leading political scientists at Vilnius University, writes, “The overwhel-
ming number of experts believe that Russia seeks to gain superpower sta-
tus and change the rules of the international system” [49]. Experts of the 
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) reached this conclusion without 
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participating in an academic exchange with Russia and without any sub-
stantial evidence. However, they state that “Russia regards the EU as a 
competitor... does not see Europe as a single or even sovereign actor in 
the international system "[40]. It should be noted that Russia is geograph-
ically an integral part of Europe, and Europe does not legally have sover-
eignty, and all experts and political actors need to consider these facts in 
foreign policy. 
The head of the Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies at 
Vilnius University Dovile Jakniunaite recognizes the complete futility of 
Lithuanian claims for compensation for the consequences of the “Soviet 
occupation of Lithuania”. In view of the fact that “It is difficult for Lithu-
ania to receive international support for its compensation claims”, she 
rightly points out that no country in Eastern Europe demanded “compen-
sation for damages caused during the Soviet occupation” [22, s. 165]. 
Analyzing the problem of "Soviet occupation" in her research, Dovile 
Jakniunaite [21; 22] maintains silence on the obvious fact that any dis-
cussion about the fate of Poland and the Baltic states should take place in 
the context of the international legal consequences of the Second World 
War, which are not subject to revision. Realizing that “without the con-
tribution of Russia, it is impossible to change the Lithuanian-Russian re-
lations” [22, s. 165] Lithuania is not trying to interest Russia in construc-
tive cooperation. At the same time in the spirit of scientific research Do-
vile Jakniunaite admits that the situation in the Baltic States is “strongly 
influenced by the dynamics of Russian-American and Russian-EU rela-
tions, but these relations are usually not associated with the goals and in-
terests of Lithuania, and sometimes even undermine them” [22, s. 165]. 
Another representative of the Center for Russian and Eastern Europe-
an Studies of Vilnius University, Remigijus Žilinskas, proposes an obvi-
ous absurdity to ensure the security of Lithuania through the "allied force, 
mobilization reserve and the development of national concepts of armed 
and unarmed resistance" against the hybrid threat posed by Russia [12]. It 
seems rather provocative that a politicized approach towards the problem 
is transmitted through scientific sources, but it is also clear that such way 
of thinking is untenable and counterproductive. 
A well-known Baltic political scientist Professor Gediminas Vitkus 
consistently expresses scepticism regarding the very possibility of nor-
malizing Russian-Lithuanian relations [11; 27]. Having received a philo-
sophical education at Moscow State University in Soviet times, Professor 
Vitkus pursued very specific goals when in 2009 in the journal of the 
University of Sapporo (Japan) wrote: “While many European countries 
still cherish certain illusions about Russia, the Lithuanian politicians and 
the general public do not. Due to specific historical experiences, Lithua-
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nians do not harbour any doubts whatsoever that Russia will attempt to 
employ its new advantages that have emerged because of a considerable 
increase in energy source prices. Not for economic development, not for 
the welfare of its people, but for political dominance and revenge for the 
lost Cold War.” [27, p. 25]. Such a sincere desire to be at the forefront of 
global political confrontation is strange for a relatively small country and 
surprising for a scientist who studied and worked in the state that lost the 
cold war. Thus, examples of political manipulations using scientific me-
dia demonstrate the attempt of certain individuals to see the conflict in 
the information space of the Baltic region only from the side that benefits 
investors of such a science. 
 
Ways of resolving international conflict  
in the information space of the Baltic region 
 
The cultural identity of the peoples of the Baltic region is clearly ma-
nifested in the process of interaction within the framework of the com-
mon information space. At the same time, the information space on prac-
tice is formed by a system of information communication networks of ge-
neral use. They function according to common technical rules on the ba-
sis of uniform political and legal principles, ensure satisfaction of the in-
formation needs of the population, and guarantee the realization of hu-
man rights and freedoms in the information sphere. 
It so happened that the Baltic region found itself at the epicentre of a 
spiritual conflict of Romanesque and Hellenistic Common European val-
ues, which does not have a definite solution. For objective economic and 
socio-cultural reasons in the Baltic region, many European innovative 
multimedia projects (Euronews, European Broadcasting Union, Erasmus +) 
are being implemented with Russian participation [8, p. 265]. At the sa-
me time, Russian media and cultural forums successfully operate in large 
cities with a Russian-speaking population in free competition environ-
ment [35; 46]. However, this positive fact will always cause Russophobia 
although only among those representatives of the Romanesque culture 
who focus on the right-wing system of values. 
While political situation is rapidly changing, the conflict unfolds be-
tween nascent Russian democracy and social groups with retrograde 
thinking that are accustomed to earning their political capital from the 
international confrontation in Europe. Such conflicts became a booming 
echo of the Cold War devoid of any progressive perspective. Objectively, 
gradual Pan-European and Eurasian integration should have smoothed 
out the existing contradictions in the economic interests and production 
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standards between the states of the Baltic Sea region. Instead, conflicts 
arise under the influence of a number of stereotypes in the information 
space of the region. The reason for this is the desire to protect the inter-
ests of small nations at the cost of discrimination of a wide range of Eu-
ropeans who speak Russian. It is obvious that in order to realize the posi-
tive potential of the cultural diversity of the Baltic region “models of or-
ganization of intercultural relations that are different from multicultural-
ism and assimilation are necessary” [47]. 
In the context of transparency of the global media space and substan-
tive differences in political cultures [43], the political vision that each 
Baltic state has of its own national interests acquire great importance. 
The situation when “the boundaries between national states are erased..., 
kinship and attachment to native land of the people is neutralized... leads 
to the perception of patriotism as an irrational feeling" [44, p. 67]. So the 
patriotic education of young people in Russia should be carried out in the 
context of the centuries-old history of the state [48, p. 31], taking into 
account the historical features of international relations in the Baltic re-
gion [3]. Professor Jean Toschenko is absolutely right when he consist-
ently advocates "for the rule according to which any person having the 
citizenship of his/her country is free to live, work and move around the 
territory of the former USSR or the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent 
States] at the same time fulfilling the duties of a citizen of the state where 
at the moment this person lives and works” [49, p. 30]. 
The political and military threats arise under conditions in which the 
national interests of certain states acquire extremist antisocial content 
contradicting the European values and interests of civil society members 
in the sustainable development of the region. Extremist intentions form 
the "appearance of war" [6, p. 46]. Social discrimination can cause acute 
conflicts at the national and international level. Such conflicts according 
to the laws of social dynamics in the information society originate inside 
the social networks and then manifest themselves in non-democratic 
forms of the protest movement, aggressive foreign policy. Largely as a 
result of the fact that “the political media space is beginning to exist not 
only in reality but also in virtual space” [50], “the unconditional image of 
democracy formed in Europe... has been shaken” [43, p. 52]. The restora-
tion of democratic ideals requires the abandonment of the policy of mul-
ticulturalism and the formation of a unified system of values and ideals in 
the process of social partnership between states and civil society institu-
tions within the sphere of education and culture. 
Overcoming the collective social trauma in the post-Soviet space is a 
prerequisite for resolving the conflict in the information space of the Bal-
tic region. According to Professor Andrey Zdravomyslov, “a view of so-
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ciety only through the prism of a traumatized mind, as a rule, distorts the 
overall picture. A healthy society finds strength to overcome injuries not 
only through media activities... but, above all, through a different compo-
sition of social action that creates a social basis for recovering from the 
trauma” [51, p. 9]. In this sense, the inability of national administrations 
to interact normally in a regional media space can significantly aggravate 
the crisis in a society. Since the countries of the Baltic region are united 
by common traditions and interests of preserving cultural diversity [3; 52], 
they are to overcome the contradictions about traumatic past of the peo-
ples in the Baltic region (such as consequences of international armed 
conflicts and political radicalism at the national level). Multilateralism re-
quires the consolidation of the efforts of the scientific community with an 
understanding of the need for good neighbourliness. 
There is a certain positive experience of cooperation between Russia 
and the EU in the field of professional journalism. The TV channel 
“Euronews” is an important segment of the common information space 
of the Baltic Sea region because this media, thanks to the flexibility of 
its editorial policy, is available to the mass audience in all countries of 
the region without exception. The agreement on cooperation between 
the Russian Federation and the TV channel “Euronews” was concluded 
on June 29, 2001. The All-Russian State Television and Radio Broad-
casting Company (VGTRK) acquired a 1.8 % stake in the Secemie con-
sortium and became one of the shareholders of the channel. Subsequent-
ly, the share of VGTRK in the consortium exceeded 16 %. French law 
guarantees the independence and objectivity of the editorial policy of 
the TV channel “Euronews” although the channel’s shareholders are 
more than twenty public and state TV companies from Europe and the 
Mediterranean. The largest packages belong to such leading national 
media holdings as France Televisions (France), RAI (Italy), VGTRK 




Undoubtedly, informational cooperation on the issues of protecting 
the health and improving the quality of life of the population, counteract-
ing environmental threats, exchanging opinions on global climate change 
issues is relevant to the Baltic region [53, p. 160]. Therefore, in our opin-
ion, mutually beneficial regional cooperation in specific areas of state 
structures’ and civil society institutions’ activities may be the issue of 
particular importance for establishing good-neighbourly relations. In this 
context, it seems necessary to supplement Clause 23 of Section V “Stra-
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tegic goals and main directions of ensuring information security” of the 
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation with a re-
gional component — a system for protecting traditional Russian spiritual 
and moral values by increasing the authority of Russian scientific institu-
tions and the media in Europe. 
The common information space assumes the consolidation of the pro-
gressive public around the regional megapolises’ media agenda. In this 
context, it is important that St. Petersburg, the largest city on the Baltic 
Sea coast, would be interested in enhancing its global competitiveness as 
a scientific, academic, cultural and industrial center with some competi-
tive advantages in the region. That competitiveness is "determined by its 
demographic potential, port traffic, as well as a favourable geo-economic 
position, the status of the “sea gate” of Russia” [54, p. 71]. In order to 
counter the identified conflict-causing influence in the Baltic region, it is 
necessary to develop national non-profit organizations in the Russian ge-
opolitical centres that can influence the political agenda in the region. 
Only the model when political structures that are close in their legal sta-
tus conduct the dialogue with those who propagate Russophobia can have 
a positive influence on the authority of the Russian Federation as a rule-
of-law state. 
The attainment of the ideals of the Council of Europe in the Russian 
megacities can turn emerging Baltic Europe without borders into an eco-
nomic and cultural centre of the European continent. Without any doubt, 
there is a need to modify the ideals of the Council of Europe taking into 
account the best cultural and legal traditions of Russia. Positive changes 
in the model of interaction between these two will occur only if the Eu-
ropean partners are interested in considering Russian interests. It seems 
rational to organize progressive model of interaction of Russian non-
profit organizations with existing progressive and regressive (conflict-
prone) structures in the EU by creating recommendatory norms of Rus-
sian corporate law in the media and scientific sphere. Such a recommen-
dation should define the circle of responsible and conscientious partners 
in the Baltic region for Russian society to establish systematic and sub-
stantive communication links. 
Creating Russian scientific information networks is an ambitious 
task, which should be solved in order to enjoy prestige in Europe and 
fully use intellectual potential available in the Baltic region. Construc-
tive initiatives have social prerequisites for the effective cooperation 
that allow seizing every reasonable opportunity and using material in-
centives for guaranteed leadership of Russian megacities in the modern 
international system. An attractive social and cultural environment for 
people does not imply conflicts on a national basis. It can only be a re-
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sult of a mutual understanding of the interests in the domain of interna-
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